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Abstract
This paper posits that firms’ corporate and technological diversification profiles
and their relatedness in terms of products and technologies impact their propensity to
form alliances for exploitation and exploration. The empirical investigation employs
a dataset of all tire producers worldwide between 1985 and 1996 that combines de-
tailed firm level data on establishment, patenting, and alliance activities. The results
support these theoretical predictions and indicate that exploitative alliances are driven
primarily by complementarity in terms of corporate diversification strategies, as well as
partner characteristics (e.g., size, age, and technological capabilities). Moreover, firms
with similar product portfolios but uneven technological performance are more likely
to engage in exploitative interactions. In contrast, exploration alliances are driven by
strong partner similarity across all firm characteristics and product portfolios. Both
market and technological diversification have positive effects on the propensity to en-
gage in explorative alliances while technological distance has a negative one.
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1 Introduction
Most of the world’s largest corporations are actively engaged in corporate diversification via
products, markets or technologies (Rumelt, 1982; Hitt et al., 1997; Suzuki and Kodama, 2004;
Ravichandran et al., 2009) as an avenue to boost performance (Robins and Wiersema, 2002;
Tanrivedi and Lee, 2008). Thus, corporate diversification is commonly employed by firms
to consolidate competitive positions (Penrose, 1959; Porter, 1987), create positive synergies
across different divisions (Teece, 1982), insulate against external threats (Amit and Livnat,
1998), and capitalize on related products and customers (Tallman and Li, 1996; Miller, 2006).
Likewise, technological diversification is consistently identified as a key contributor to firm
growth (Granstrand, 2000), performance (Leten et al., 2007) and innovation (Huang and
Chen, 2010) through significant economies of scale, scope, speed, and space that complement
each other (Fai, 1999). As a result, the degree of technological diversification has increased
significantly in the last decades (Giuri et al., 2004), and intricate technological portfolios
are common today among leading firms in many industries (Cantwell and Piscitello, 2000;
Quintana-Garcia and Velasco, 2008).
Besides diversification strategies, which mandate significant resource commitments, firms
may also acquire competences and leverage existing assets through external links with other
companies (Stuart, 2000; Giuri et al., 2004; Wang and Zajac, 2007). Driven by technological
change and global competition, exploratory inter-firm agreements that involve bilateral ex-
changes of technologies like public-private partnerships, outsourced or networked R&D and
technological alliances have gained significant momentum in recent years (Gulati, 1995a;
Stuart, 1998; Kale et al., 2000; Kim and Inkpen, 2005; Gnyawali et al., 2011).1 Similarly,
exploitative agreements that capitalize on existing technological competencies such as sub-
contracting, original equipment manufacturing (OEM), licensing, or joint venture projects
are responsible for significant one-way flows of technologies, which have boosted productivity
of many small and medium firms in emerging markets (Lee and Beamish, 1995; Narula and
Sadowski, 2002). Broadly encapsulated under the concept of technological alliances, these
interactions have been extensively employed by firms for both exploitation and exploration
2 (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; DeMan and Duysters, 2005; Yamakawa et al., 2011). How-
ever, these functional types of alliances are qualitatively different as explorative agreements
focus on the search for new knowledge, while exploitative ones emphasize the use of existing
1For example, in 2003, contracted-out R&D for US manufacturers grew three times faster than the internal
one, public-private R&D partnerships flourished with 2,936 cooperative R&D agreements, and the number
technological alliances worldwide was almost 700 (NSF, 2006).
2This study adopts a broad definition of alliances that includes a range of interactions from simple
contractual agreements (licensing, technology sharing) to establishment of new separate entities (JV) or
joint R&D projects.
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knowledge (March, 1991).
With respect to the drivers of these alliances, the literature has proposed a variety of
explanations spanning different levels of analysis (Hagedoorn, 1993; Oxley, 1999; Garcia-
Canal et al., 2008). Accordingly, firms form alliances as a way to access new markets
(Glaister, 1996) and technologies (Kale et al., 2000) while deriving certain strategic benefits
from these relationships such as lower uncertainty and costs (Narula, 2003) or greater market
power (Kogut, 1991). Yet, the question of how firms select alliance partners has received
less attention in the literature (Nielsen, 2003). A survey of more than 40 studies suggests
that partner complementarity, commitment, and compatibility (fit) are the key drivers of
alliances (Shah and Swaminathan, 2008). While all these attributes are vital for forming a
successful alliance, their effects are contingent on other factors such as the context of the
alliance (Kale and Singh, 2009), firms’ experience (Rothaermel and Boeker, 2008), level of
mutual trust (Gulati, 1995b), and idiosyncratic characteristics of managers (Einsehardt and
Schoonhoven, 1996) and agreements themselves (Shah and Swaminathan, 2008).
While this large body of research provides many insights into the drivers of alliances, it
still lacks depth in several areas. First, despite the plethora of studies examining multiple
issues surrounding diversification strategies on one hand, and alliances on the other, these
streams of literature remain, in essence, autarkic (Mowery et al., 1998; Giuri et al., 2004).
Furthermore, with few exceptions (Samharya, 1995; Fai, 1999; Wang and Zajac, 2007), most
studies on firm diversification adopt a skewed view of this phenomenon, focusing solely on
one aspect (e.g., product, market, international or technology). Second, alliances are often
examined at isolated levels of analysis, either the transaction, firm, dyad, or network. In-
stead, recent advances in the literature advocate the use of more comprehensive frameworks
for analysis across multiple levels which are better suited for capturing the heterogeneity
behind the motives for forming alliances and provide also richer predictions in the presence
of competing explanations (Wang and Zajac, 2007; Duysters et al., 2007; Lin et al., 2009).
Finally, most empirical studies on alliances are confined to high-tech sectors (e.g., IT, elec-
tronics or biotechnology) and firms from the developed Triad (i.e., North America, Japan
and Europe) as a result of data availability across countries and industries (Schilling, 2009).
This restricts significantly the generality of their findings and policy implications regard-
ing non-high-tech industries and developing nations (Hirsch-Kreinsen, 2008; Szirmai, 2009),
which remain severely underrepresented in this literature (De Man and Duysters, 2005).
This study contributes to the extant literature by focusing on the role of diversification
across two dimensions (corporate and technological) on formation of technological alliances
for exploration and exploitation. It argues that firms’ choices are affected by both exter-
nal opportunities (to increase, complement, or leverage existing technological capabilities)
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and perceived risks and costs (to coordinate, maintain relationships, protect from unwanted
spillovers) that are common for both formation of alliances and diversification strategies.
The proposed contributions target three important aspects. First, this work introduces
theoretical mechanisms for the relation between firm diversification profiles (corporate and
technological) and the decision to form technological alliances. Notably, I argue that both
corporate and technological diversification signal superior capabilities and resources that in-
crease the appeal for an alliance and, moreover, provide additional knowledge to firms on
how to utilize their technological assets for exploitation and exploration. Second, this study
adopts a multi-level approach to address the heterogeneity of drivers behind alliance forma-
tion (Wang and Zajac, 2007) and jointly examines the effects of firm- and dyadic- factors on
firms propensity to form alliances. To this end, I focus on the effects of technological and
product similarity between prospective partners on alliance formation as greater similarity
allows firms to lower coordination costs, facilitates mutual learning and takes advantage of
existing synergies to improve efficiency. Finally, the empirical investigation focuses on a
mature and low-tech industry (i.e., tires) that is characterized by a global reach, significant
R&D efforts at the top, and a great variety of diversification strategies. Together, these
factors establish the tire industry as a suitable candidate for testing these hypotheses and
provide an opportunity to augment the alliance literature by shifting the focus on intra-firm
technology transfers to developing countries and alliance drivers in low-tech sectors that still
account for a large share of production and employment in many countries (Hirsch-Kreinsen,
2008).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The second section develops testable
hypotheses for the relationship between firms’ diversification profiles and their choices for
technological alliances. Then, next section describes the dataset, variables employed, and
the estimation choices made in the empirical part followed by a discussion of results (Section
4) and conclusions (Section 5).
2 Theory and hypotheses
2.1 Alliances as vehicles for technology transfers
Over the past decades, driven by both competitive pressures from globalization and rapid
advances in technological pace of industries, alliances have become an increasingly popular
avenue to enhance firm competitiveness (Contractor and Lorange, 2002). Conceptualized
as long-term agreements between firms seeking to improve the competitive position of part-
ners by pooling of resources and capabilities (Hagedoorn, 1993), alliances have been used
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extensively by firms to access additional resources, minimize transaction costs, and secure
market advantages (Anand and Khanna, 2000). Moreover, many alliances nowadays exhibit
technological exchanges and target international partners (Narula and Hagedoorn, 1998;
Garcia-Canal et al., 2008). In terms of organizational choices, alliances are extremely flex-
ible, ranging from simple long-term contractual agreements with a narrow focus (e.g., long
standing licensing or technology-sharing agreements) to formation of new entities (e.g., joint-
ventures), all with the goal of maximizing the sought benefits (e.g., mitigate R&D risks, push
new industry standards, access new markets) of such collaborations (Teece, 1986; Veugelers
and Cassiman, 2002; Wang and Zajac, 2007).
As a result, technological alliances represent today an attractive way for firms to use their
technological knowledge to access complementary assets or secure competitive advantages
via exploration and exploitation (Santangelo, 2000; Kim and Inkpen, 2005; Duysters et
al., 2007; Sampson, 2007). While exploration alliances require partners to learn from each
other or acquire new knowledge with the specific purpose of creating new capabilities and
competences, exploitation alliances are clearly focused on leveraging existing resources and
capabilities for more immediate gains (March, 1991). Although, firms benefit significantly
from both types of alliances (Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006), the choice between exploration
and exploitation is a result of a variety of factors that stem from firms’ strategic intentions,
potential for learning, and the expected returns from their technological assets (Koza and
Lewin 1998). Therefore, it is imperative to analyze them separately in conjecture with
partners’ diversification profiles and their dyadic similarities, and develop an integrative
perspective on the relation between various diversification types and alliance choices (Figure
1).
2.2 Firm diversification profile
Starting with the seminal work of Penrose (1959), many studies have examined the link
between diversification and firm performance (Palich et al., 2000). Despite this large body
of work, these effects are still debated in the literature (Hitt et al., 1997). Most theoretical
studies argue that diversified firms will be more successful, as they possess a wider range of
alternative mechanisms (e.g., predatory pricing, cross-subsidization, capital and labor flexi-
bility) to deal with competitive pressures and environmental uncertainty. These mechanisms
allow them to be more proficient in exploiting their market power (Amit and Livnat, 1988),
capitalize on technological resources (Barney, 1997), and take advantage of economies of
scale and scope (Rumelt, 1982). However, at high levels of diversification, firm’s operating
costs surge as well. Thus, as firms expand further away from their core specialty (i.e., prod-
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Figure 1: Conceptual framework regarding diversification profiles and alliance decisions
ucts, markets or technologies), these costs rise sharply (Hitt et al., 1994) suggesting that
intermediate levels of diversification could yield the biggest benefits (Geringer et al., 1989).
This conjecture is confirmed by recent empirical evidence which indicates a curvilinear re-
lationship between the degree of diversification and firm performance (Palich et al., 2000),
contingent on industry- and firm-specifics (Hitt et al., 1990).
In relation to alliance formation, the size and composition of firm’s technological resources
are indicative of its potential for setting up technological alliances (Rothaermel, 2001) and
licensing deals (Arora et al., 2001). However, this potential is not automatically realized
without additional efforts to manage and nourish such partnering relationships (Chesbrough,
2007; Miotti and Sachwald, 2003). When a firm diversifies, it implicitly acquires greater
knowledge (of markets, products, consumers, competitors, technologies, etc.), which in turn
allows it to identify better and faster external opportunities (e.g., form an alliance) for
the exploitation and exploration of its technological capabilities. Therefore, to integrate
these different aspects of firm diversification in relationship with its choices for technological
alliances, I consider markets and technologies as the two most common aspects of firm
diversification strategies (Hitt et al., 1997; Granstrand, 2000) and argue that they will impact
firms’ decision to form a technological alliance.
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2.2.1 Corporate diversification
Corporate diversification means branching out into new business opportunities, either in
the form of new markets or new products, both with important consequences for firm com-
petitiveness (Rumelt, 1982). For this study I will focus mainly on one aspect of corporate
diversification strategy, namely new markets or niches (Palich et al., 2000). In today’s glob-
alized world, firm activities often sprawl across multiple industries, which makes it difficult
to assign them a single (or even a main) industry affiliation. Some extreme examples of this
would be industrial conglomerates such as General Electric in the USA, Japanese Keiretsus,
or the Korean Chaebols that are actively involved in numerous lines of business. Market
diversification across is defined as the business expansion into new market segments that
have not been targeted in the past, where firms can realize benefits through economies of
scale and superior internal routines3. In general, firms diversify across multiple markets to
consolidate their competitive position, create synergies between divisions, cope efficiently
with competitors, and insulate against external threats (Amit and Livnat 1988).
2.2.2 Technological diversification
Technological diversification is described as the expansion of firms’ knowledge base into a
wider range of technical fields (Miller, 2006). This increase in the size and depth of firm’s
technological portfolios has become a surging trend in industrialized countries (Breschi et
al., 2003; Leten et al., 2007) supporting arguments regarding the role of technology for
competitive advantage and market success (Granstrand 2003). Thus, greater technological
endowments bear positive effects on firm economic and innovative performance, leading to a
better and sustainable competitive position (Suzuki and Kodama, 2004; Garcia-Vega, 2006;
Huang and Chen, 2010). Moreover, as technological diversification is a subject of path-
dependencies (Cantwell and Andersen, 1996), it actually represents a good predictor for
firms’ long-run product diversification strategies (Pavitt, 1998)4.
2.2.3 The relationship between corporate and technological diversification
The relationship between corporate (in the form of either market or product diversification)
and technological diversification is quite complex (Fai, 2004). Patel and Pavitt (1997) were
the first to show that the degree of technological diversification for large firms was much
greater than the product one. Firms tap into different of business niches, which in turn
require a set of technological capabilities and products, and these bases tend to co-evolve
3This is an inter-industry indicator for firm’s success across multiple domains of activity.
4This is an indicator for firm’s overall technological performance.
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over time. As a result, technological breadth is often a good predictor for introduction
of new products, which in turn increases its market share and allows it to penetrate new
markets and niches (Pavitt, 1998). Thus, regardless of choices in terms of these diversification
strategies (e.g., focus on one or both; concurrently or sequentially), their interaction remains
an important source of firm dynamism and growth over time (Granstrand, 2003). As both the
needs of consumers and the firm competences evolve in response to changes in demand and
competitive position, more resource-business couplings are typically added than scrapped by
firms, which results in increased diversification (Fai, 2004).
In terms of theoretical explanations, the resource-based arguments focus on the related-
ness between products from economies of scale and scope and the limited range of resources.
Alternatively, evolutionary economics emphasizes the evolution of products and markets as
a result of their underlying technologies. Employing routines and learning-by-doing firms
are able to generate slack to be used for product diversification, where search and selection
processes build on existing technological competences, seeking synergies for new corporate
avenues for diversification (Mowery et al., 1998; Piscitello, 2004). Hence, the interplay be-
tween technological and corporate diversification appears to be strong and mostly positive in
theory, but the direction and strength of this relationship are yet to be assessed empirically
in the literature (Fai, 2004).
2.3 Diversification profiles and alliance decisions
Combining arguments from the dynamic capabilities theory (Teece et al., 1997; Luo, 2000)
and organizational learning (Levitt and March, 1988; March, 1991), I argue that firms that
are more diversified across markets and technologies will be more likely to engage in tech-
nological alliances for both exploitative and explorative reasons. This will occur through
several mechanisms.
First, corporate diversification across different markets can be seen both as a substitute
and a complement for technological alliances. In support of the former, firms need to commit
exta resources for the management of both diversification and alliances, and quite often with
similar objectives (Tsang, 1998). Therefore, if a firm is not able to reach certain niches due
to limited resources or capabilities, setting up an alliance with a partner in that market
represents a viable alternative to internal diversification (Giuri et al., 2004). Subsequently,
firms are faced with a ”make, buy or ally” decision, which shifts resources between internal
development of dynamic capabilities via diversification strategies and outsourcing to external
partners via an alliance (Geyskens et al., 2006).
In contrast, market diversification can stimulate alliance formation by providing firms
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with additional knowledge on potential avenues to capitalize on existing technological assets
or develop new technical capabilities that meet better the needs of these markets. Thus,
corporate diversification across markets establishes future channels for exploration and ex-
ploitation of technological opportunities outside firm’s core-industry (Luo, 2000). Consistent
with these arguments, studies on market diversification in an international context propose
a complementary relationship between resources and capabilities required for alliance for-
mation on one hand, and diversification strategies on the other (Tsang, 1998; Brouthers and
Hennart 2007). Moreover, market diversification increases both firms’ appeal as an alliance
partner (given the extended capabilities required to be successful in multiple markets), and
the access to a larger pool of potential partners from all these markets in which it is active.
Hence, diversification provides firms with more options for both exploitation and exploration
of their technological assets (Makino and Delios, 1996). Ultimately, firm’s ability to generate
synergies between its technological competences and its diversification strategies determines
its economic performance (Piscitello, 2004).
Second, technological diversity is directly linked with firm’s involvement in technological
alliances, as highly diversified firms in terms of technology are not able to rely exclusively
on internal R&D efforts (Garcia-Vega, 2006; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006). Many of them
need to acquire and complement their in-house knowledge with external sources such as
in-licensing or joint research with third parties, e.g., research institutes, universities, and
even competitors (Narula, 2003). In these cases, firms with large technology portfolios
rely heavily on external sources of knowledge through either acquisition, outsourcing or
collaboration (Granstrand, 2000; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006). Despite this, sharing
technology with other firms in the industry is a double-edge sword. On one end, it implies a
negative relationship between technological diversity and alliances, since firms would like to
maintain exclusive rights on internal technical expertise, and therefore minimize any possible
spillovers to competitors (Rivette and Kline, 1999; Granstrand, 2000; Lin et al., 2009).
Oppositely, most firms have a much larger base of technologies than products (Gambardella
and Torissi, 1998; Breschi et al., 2003) due to the increasing complexity of product and
processes over time (Rycroft and Kash 1999). Thus, most of these technologically-diversified
firms go well beyond their core-business in terms of technical competencies, and alliances give
them the ability to exploit successfully this pool of technological assets in related industries,
or even via collaborations with competitors (Patel and Pavitt, 1997; Gambardella et al.,
2007). As a result, technological diversification brings more exploration and exploitation
opportunities encouraging alliance formation (Giuri et al., 2004)5. Well-diversified firms
5Giuri et al. (2004) find a strong correlation (0.83) between firm diversification and involvement in
alliances, contingent on industry and temporal characteristics.
9
will prefer to exploit their technical know-how in alliances where they will act as providers
of technologies for other firms, or seek new possibilities for exploration in collaborative
partnerships with other well-endowed firms.
Finally, tapping the global technology markets (for exploitation) and the quest for tech-
nological partners (for exploration) are both complex processes, marked by continuos trials
and frequent failures (Arora et al., 2001; Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2002). Firms face significant
difficulties in finding appropriate partners for exploitation and exploration, as this requires
balancing different characteristics of prospective partners and their potential impact on the
alliance objectives and success (Kale and Singh, 2009). As a result, partner selection in
alliances is largely determined by the perception of appropriation and coordination concerns
vis a vis prospective partners (Gulati and Singh, 1998). In this context, diversification may
also reflect knowledge about markets and technologies which a firm acquires as a byproduct
of its activities (Granstrand, 2000). While firms may poses significant technological assets
that cater to both partners within and outside their core area of activity, they often have
difficulties in identifying these opportunities, especially in distant areas of activity. Firms
with broader knowledge of other markets, products, and technologies will take advantage
of learning effects and economies of scale and scope (Teece et al., 1997), increasing further
their reach to new alliance partners. Thus, diversity across these dimensions has a positive
influence on firms’ prospects for new alliance objectives and prospective partners (Kogut
and Zander, 1992). This reasoning is particularly salient for larger firms that do not face
a significant resource constraint in terms of exploitation and exploration of technologies in-
house, but are actually actively seeking to optimize the usage of their technological assets
(Teece, 2006).
Incorporating all these arguments, well-diversified firms (across markets and technologies)
will be more likely to get involved in technological alliances altogether, and in accordance with
the theory of dynamic capabilities (Teece 2007). Firms’ degree of diversification reflects their
knowledge of markets and products (Granstrand, 2000) as well as their success in acquiring
external technological knowledge via inter-firm collaborative and licensing agreements (Con-
tractor and Lorange 2002; Chesbrough, 2007). Hence, as they become more diversified, firms
will be more likely to engage in alliances for both exploitation and exploration rationales.
Finally, diversification will trigger different alliance strategies regarding exploration and
exploitation. Firms with significant abilities (in terms of market and technical know-how)
have the possibility to engage in both exploitative alliances (where they can leverage their
technological assets) and exploration alliances (in which to actively exchange and produce
new technical knowledge). In contrast, firms with lower capabilities, as proxied by less
market and technological diversification will be less likely to form technological alliances for
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exploration, as their technical and corporate know-how is not sufficiently developed to attract
the interest of better-endowed firms in the industry (Koza and Lewin, 2000; Rothaermel and
Deeds, 2004). As a result, these firms will be eligible only for exploitative alliance, in which
they will likely act as recipients of technologies from more diversified and technologically-
endowed partners in exchange for other privileges such as market access, production facilities,
distribution channels (Giuri et al., 2004; Yang et al., 2011).
In light of all these considerations, I propose the following hypotheses:
H1. Corporate and technological diversification of a firm will increase its propen-
sity to engage in exploitation alliances as a provider of technology (a) or in an
exploration alliance as a technological partner (b).
2.4 Dyadic characteristics and alliance decisions
In addition to the diversification profiles of prospective partners, their joint characteristics
(similarities or dissimilarities) are also important for alliance formation and its success (Kale
and Singh, 2009). Such dyadic similarities between firms in terms of products, markets and
technologies are generically referred to as ”business relatedness” (Koh and Venkatraman,
1991) but its definition and operationalization varies significantly in the literature (Wang
and Zajac, 2007). Given that firms’ resources and capabilities can be conceptualized across
multiple dimensions (e.g., products, markets, technologies) and levels of analysis (e.g., busi-
ness units, plants, managers), I focus on the two most common dimensions of business and
technological relatedness, namely products and technologies.
2.4.1 Product similarity
Product similarity is defined as the overlap in the production space between two prospective
alliance partners. Firms seek synergies from collaborations to increase their efficiency levels.
Similar firms poses similar types of assets and operations, yielding immediate gains from
collaborations. This conjecture is supported by most empirical findings in the literature.
For instance, Wang and Zajac (2007) show that business similarity (computed using 4 digit
NAICS codes) impacts firms’ decision to ally or acquire. Lee et al. (2008) find a U-shaped
relationship between organizational similarity and the subsequent learning in an alliance.
Finally, Yang et al. (2010) argue that firms’ similarity in terms of status (i.e., its position
among peers) influence their partnering decisions. While the literature suggests that syner-
getic benefits are greater from complementary resources in the case of acquisitions (Harrison
et al., 2001), I extend these rationales and argue that product similarity of firms will have a
positive effect on the propensity to form technological alliances.
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Alliances present firms with opportunities to enrich their existing technical knowledge
(via exploration) and cash-in on their technological assets (via exploitation). Contingent
to these functions, they also grant access to partners’ pools of resources and capabilities
(Stuart, 2000; Doh, 2000) with different implications for exploitation and exploration. For
the latter, organizational learning theory suggests that product similarity is necessary for a
successful alliance, as it facilitates organizational efficiency (Garette and Dausauge, 2000)
and encourages mutual learning (Teece, 2006). The required consensus over controversial
decisions in an alliance could trigger costly and time consuming negotiations and delays
which will affect the success of the alliance. As a result, similar firms are better positioned
to work as alliance partners that tap into benefits arising from their business similarity
(Tanriverdi and Venkatraman, 2005), while reducing costs and uncertainty surrounding the
alliance.
Furthermore, exploration alliances are set-up with an explicit goal of acquiring new knowl-
edge (Inkpen, 2001). In turn, this objective mandates similarity (in terms of skills, routines,
products, competences) to meet successfully the learning objectives of such partnerships
(Harrison et al., 2001) and generate economic benefits for firms (Gulati 1995a). Firms with
similar products are more likely to share inputs, technologies and markets, which makes
them more aware of each other’s potential for contribution in the alliance, as well as in
terms of ex-post expectations regarding the scope of knowledge transfer and access to privi-
leged information (Bleeke and Ernst, 1995). Moreover, similarity between partners presents
opportunities for greater value creation in the alliance in the absence of conflicting economic
interests and informational asymmetries (Wang and Zajac, 2007). Thus, explorative endeav-
ors focusing on learning are more likely to be successful if the two partners are more similar
(Mowery et al., 1998).
In contrast, exploitative alliances are commonly set-up as contract-based partnerships
with a unidirectional transfer of technology, which include licensing, subcontracting, or dis-
tribution agreements (Das and Teng, 2000). In these cases, product similarity is important
for both the provider and the recipient of technology for similar reasons. The technology-
providing firm cannot manage a successful transfer of knowledge to its partner if it is not
active in the same niche of production. Likewise, the ability of the recipient firm to receive
and implement successfully new technologies is conditioned by the degree of fit with the
technology provider (Mowery et al., 1998). When both prospective alliance partners have
similar product portfolios they are better able to evaluate each others’ assets, and the ability
of the alliance to deliver positive outcomes. In such situations, firms can benefit easily from
complementary assets (i.e., technology is transferred from one firm to the other in exchange
of financial, marketing or production compensation). Furthermore, product similarity gen-
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erates naturally knowledge about each other, and reduces the existing informational asym-
metries surrounding the alliance (Wang and Zajac, 2007). As a result, product similarity
increases firms’ incentives to form an exploitative alliance by maximizing their joint benefits
of resource combinations from similar assets and reducing appropriation and coordination
concerns (Tanriverdi and Venkatraman, 2005; Lee et al., 2008).
Following these arguments, I hypothesize that firms which are similar in terms of product
portfolios to be more likely to engage in technological alliance for both exploitation and
exploration:
H2. Product similarity between a pair of firms has a positive effect on their
propensity to form an exploitation alliance (a) or an exploration one (b).
2.4.2 Technological distance
Prior studies of alliance performance and partnering decisions using patent statistics reveals
a positive relationship between technological similarity of partners and alliance occurrence,
especially in high-tech industries where both alliances and large technological portfolios are
quite common (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Stuart, 1998; Wang and Zajac, 2007). These
studies rely on the assumption that the technological similarity or relatedness of partners
increases their absorptive capacity, and allows them to tap more successfully into each others’
pools of knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). That ultimately leads to greater diffusion of
knowledge and cross-fertilization of ideas among the alliance partners producing more value.
While most existing studies hypothesize a linear relationship between firms’ technological
similarity (or its inverse concept, technological distance) and the decision to ally or acquire,
the evidence about the sign and shape of this relationship remains mixed (Folta, 1998;
Colombo, 2003; Sampson, 2007; Mc Gill, 2007).
Similarly to the effects of product similarity on alliance choices, I expect that technolog-
ical distance (dissimilarity) to have different implications for firms’ propensity to engage in
exploration and exploitation. Thus, technological distance is a major barrier for the success-
ful transmission of technical knowledge, as greater distance implies lower absorptive capacity
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Therefore, technologically-distant partners will be conducive
of only exploitative interactions and specialized roles in the alliance: the firm with less ex-
pertise will rely more on external sources of knowledge and act as a recipient of technology
in these exploitative agreements, while its partner will make use of its existing competencies
to become a provider of technology. Moreover, greater distance between firms with limited
absorptive capacity will increase coordination and implementation costs for both partners,
as well the the risk of leakage of technical information. These costs and risks will discourage
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partners from engaging in these types of agreements when they are very different (i.e., dis-
tant) in terms of technological portfolios. Therefore, technological distance will have positive
effects on firms’ propensity to engage in exploitation alliances (technology provider-recipient
relationships) but this effect would be greater at intermediate levels of distance.
Likewise, a large distance between prospective partners in terms of internal technological
capabilities will deter the formation of exploration alliances (Sampson, 2007). In these cases,
highly innovative firms will limit their search to the nearest firms in terms of technological
assets (Rothaermel and Boeker, 2007), therefore reducing the coordination and appropriation
risks of the alliance (Gulati and Singh, 1998). This conjecture is supported also by the exist-
ing empirical evidence, which suggests that firms with less distant technological capabilities
are more likely to form an alliance (Mowery et al., 1998), stimulate cross-learning (Lane and
Lubatkin, 1998) and innovation in the post-alliance period (Ahuja, 2000; Sampson, 2007).
Therefore, greater technological distance is likely to reduce firms’ propensity to engage in
explorative alliances.
However, if technological distance between two prospective partners is zero (i.e., there
is a complete overlap between the technological assets of these firms) the opportunities for
learning are greatly reduced (Hagedoorn, 1993; Yang et al., 2010). Pooling together very
similar resources and competences does not encourage exploration, and leaves little room
for creativity, as partners have little room to learn from each other. Therefore, diversity
in terms of partner technological capabilities may actually increase firm learning (Sampson,
2007) and enhance their absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Subsequently,
firms face a trade-off between choosing a similar (low distance) partner in technological ca-
pabilities but decrease their exploration opportunities, and choose a different (distant) one
that creates more possible combinations and learning avenues but with higher coordination
and appropriation risks. This effect will be even more salient for firms in low-tech industries,
where average technological differences across firms are larger than those in high-tech in-
dustries with more even distribution of R&D expenditures across all firms (Hirsch-Kreinsen,
2008). In light of these arguments, technological distance between two prospective partners
will exhibit a negative and non-linear effect on their propensity to engage in an exploration
alliance.
This yields the final hypothesis:
H3. Technological distance between a pair of firms has a positive effect on their
propensity to form an exploitation alliance (a) and a negative non-linear effect
on their propensity to form an exploration one (b).
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3 Method
3.1 Sample and data collection
The dyadic dataset employed in this study includes data on tire producers worldwide be-
tween 1985 and 1996, collected from various issues of two industrial journals, namely the
European Rubber Journal and Rubber and Plastic News6. The tire industry exhibits a wide
range of international collaborations thus providing a propitious environment for testing my
hypotheses. Its geographic representation remained constant over the time interval con-
sidered (around 80 countries) and it exhibited possitive growth rates for the number of
firms (4%), production plants (2.5%), and active technological alliances (6%) (for details see
Table 3). Regarding the latter, most exploitative alliances (i.e, production/marketing agree-
ments, ongoing licensing, etc.) occur between a firm from a developed country and one from
a developing one, while explorative alliances (i.e., R&D projects, cross-licensing, etc.) form
between firms from developed countries (Table 6). In terms of size, large firms (i.e, top 50
firms in the industry) are those that engage exclusively in exploitative alliances as providers
of technology and as technological partners in explorative ones, given the concentration of
R&D efforts towards the top of the industry 7. Furthermore, most of these agreements are
international, given the overall concentration of the industry at a global level (e.g., the ”Big
Three” -Michelin, Goodyear and Bridgestone- hold around 45% of the global market).
The dataset includes details on all tire producers worldwide: location and opening year of
each of their plants; type of ownership, number of employees; tire types produced, available
technology, and production capacity. However, there is some variance in terms of availability
of data across years and countries, resulting in an unbalanced panel. Since I am interested
in the occurrence of agreements between two firms in the industry, both when serving as
a provider or as a recipient of technology, the dataset is organized as directed dyads in the
case of exploitative alliances and non-directed dyads for explorative ones8. In the directed
dyads ij, corresponding to an exploitation alliance, firm i is considered the source (i.e.,
provider) of technology, while j is the target (recipient) of it, resulting in an unidirectional
transfer of technology from i to j. In contrast, in the undirected dyadic data corresponding
6The resulting agreements have been cross-checked with alliance and joint-venture data from Thomson’s
SDC Platinum restricting our search to horizontal agreements involving tire producers
7For example, the ”Big Three” (Michelin, Goodyear and Bridgestone) contribute roughly to almost 40%
of the R&D investments, and are responsible directly or indirectly (i.e, through majority-owned subsidiaries)
for a third of the technological alliances in the industry.
8Thus, in each year we have observations on all the potential alliances between two firms A and B (on
average there are 400 firms active firms), resulting in a total of more than 160,000 possible observations
for each year. After matching these dyads with the specifics, the working sample is approximately 400,000
paired observations for the 12 years covered, pending on the models’ specification.
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to an explorative alliance, it is not possible to make this distinction as both partnering firms
contribute with technical knowledge to the alliance, and these exchanges are bilateral in
nature.
3.2 Dependent variables and model
The dependent variable captures the probability of an alliance between firm A and firm B
in year t. The purpose of the alliance can be either exploitation or exploration. Thus:
PABtn = F [XAt, XBt, DABt]
where PABt is the probability that A and B will engage in a technological alliance of
either exploitative or explorative nature (n), F is the cumulative probability function, XAt
is a set of A’s characteristics, XBt is a set of B’s characteristics and DABt describe dyad’s
characteristics. Data on the type and details of these technological alliances comes from
the European Rubber Journal. Following Lavie and Rosenkopf (2006), I code this quali-
tative information from alliance announcements, and distinguish between exploration (i.e.,
joint R&D projects , R&D based joint-ventures) and exploitation alliances (i.e., those with
a technological component but mainly concerned with joint marketing, service, OEM, li-
censing, supply or production) between all possible firm dyads (pairs). Different from Lavie
and Rosenkopf (2006), this study focuses solely on the horizontal dimension of technological
alliances and therefore it does not have a ”hybrid alliance” category, which would combine
knowledge-generating R&D with vertical integration of other activities. This focus on hor-
izontal alliances is driven both by arguments for theoretical clarity (Phelps, 2010), and the
empirical particularities of the industry, which indicate a very high incidence of technological
partnerships exclusively among tire producers, as the top 20 tire producers are responsible
for 80 to 90% of R&D and innovation in this industry (ERJ, various issues). Hence, I
construct two binary dependent variables which equal 1 if there is an exploitative alliance
(exploit alliance) or an exploratory one (explore alliance) and 0 otherwise.
3.3 Independent variables
I measure corporate diversification as the percentage of total sales from other products/services
than tires. This data is available for the 75 largest tire manufacturers in the world from var-
ious issues of the European Rubber Journal. For the rest I assume that their corporate
diversification is zero, which is reasonable given their small assets against the significant
resource requirements to penetrate other markets. However, to control for potential biases
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from these missing observations regarding firms’ sales, I include also a ”no-data” dummy
for all firms that are missing this information. Consistent with my assumption, these coef-
ficients suggest that, on average, smaller firms are less likely to form an alliance, especially
an exploitative one. Furthermore, over time, some tire producers have been acquired by
larger conglomerates or divested their efforts to other non-tire areas of business resulting in
extreme values for market diversification9. However, considering their historical and relative
importance for the industry I do not eliminate any of these potential outliers from my final
sample but instead, I perform some additional checks to make sure that they are not biasing
my results10.
Technological diversification is computed using international patent data from Derwent
Innovation Index (ISI Thomson) across different IPC (International Patent Classification)
classes. All patents contain one or more technology field (IPC) given by a patent examiner
that signals a certain application or technical function. A search in Derwent using keywords
(”tyre” or ”tire”) combined with a manual filtering of recipients based on name matching,
led to the collection of a pool of patents specific to tire technology between 1963 and 2010.
An excerpt of the main (i.e., top 25) classes and subclasses associated with tire technologies
is given in Table 8 and includes different technological processes that range from produc-
tion of pneumatic or solid tires (B60C; B29D 30/00) to component manufacturing such as
cords (D02G 03/48) or bands (B60C 11/00), and post-production tasks such as pressure
measurements (G01L 17/00), testing (G01M 17/02) or repairing processes (B29C 73/00).
This collection of tire related patent data reveals that the knowledge base of this industry
extends beyond tire producers. An example of this broad knowledge base is the growing
body of patents held by different car manufacturers (Honda, Ford, BMW, etc.) in key con-
tingent areas like automotive, electronics and engineering, which exhibit significant growth
potential for the future. Moreover, this pool of patents suggests that the complexity of tire
technologies has increased over time, as reflected by the growing number of IPC classes,
contradicting the conventional wisdom on innovation in a ”low-tech” industry such as this
one. Using this patent data, I compute a diversification measure using a technological con-
centration index for each firm in the tire industry. Previous studies document that 4-digit
level measures are very robust already (Van Zeebroeck et al., 2006)11. Since I focus only on
9Dunlop is one of these cases in which after its acquisition by BTR Plc. many of its operations have been
sold to third parties, resulting in a very small contribution of 1-2% tire sales to BTR’s total sales. Other
outliers are companies such as Nokia Corporation (Finland), Fulda (Germany); Inoue Rubber (Thailand);
Trelleborg AB (Sweden) that have aggressively diverted their focus to contingent areas such as industrial
elastomer parts, electronics and automotives, advanced polymers, etc., which have also resulted in lower
contribution of tire to their total sales
10In an additional analysis I eliminate all firms with percent of sales from tires of less than 10% and obtain
similar results. These estimations are available upon request
11Overall, the IPC-4 scheme contains about 70,000 entries (classification symbols) arranged in a tree-
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one industry (thus one core-technology, i.e., tires) I use an even finer (8 digit) granulation
of IPC codes to capture more accurately differences in technological specialization and the
overlap between various tire producers.
Thus, the technological diversification index is computed as the inverse of a modified
Herfindhal index for the top 25 IPC classes (k = 1, 25) in which a firm A is patenting:
TECHDIV 25A = 1/
25∑
k=1
(pkA)
2
where
pkA =
NkA∑n
k=1N
k
A
and pkA is the percentage of firm A’s patents in IPC-8 subclass k of the total number of classes
(n) . If k is not among the top 25 patent classes in which A patents, I assume (pkA)
2 → 0, an
assumption that holds in most cases, given the great level of detail of patent data employed.
Hence, a higher value for TECHDIV implies greater diversification, thus more IPC classes
covered by a firms ’patents and a more even spread across these classes. For an example,
see Table 8 in Appendix A. As a robustness test, I also explore other measures of diversity
employed in the literature (technological breadth as the count of IPC-8 classes in which a
firm patents tire technology, an entropy measure, and the sum of the logs of one over the
variable in each class), all with similar results.
Production similarity is captured using production sets of two partnering firms (A and
B). Since these are discrete variables (e.g. categories of tires they produce), I compute a
Jaccard index following the formula:
PRODSIMA,B =
TA ∩ TB
TA ∪ TB
where PRODSIMA,B is the computed production similarity score between firm A and firm B
and TA and TB represent their production sets in terms of tire types from A and respectively,
B. Following the ERJ statistics I consider 9 types of tires: passenger, light truck, heavy
truck or bus, agricultural, motorcycle, earthmover/all terrain, pneumatic industrial, aircraft,
and racing tires. Most producers tend to specialize, designating specific production tasks to
certain facilities, so that plants that produce more than 3-4 types of tires are quite rare12
Tm ∈ 1..9,m = A,B and PRODSIMA,B ∈ (0, 1) and bigger values for PRODSIMA,B
like structure. About 10 percent of these groups are main groups (further details are available at:
http://www.wipo.int/classifications/ipc/en/).
1253 percent of the firms produce maximum three tire types, and only 9 firms worldwide produce 7 or
more types.
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indicate greater similarity between A and B.
I compute the technological distance between two tire producers as an Euclidian distance
in terms of IPC classes in which partners patent most frequently (have a higher propensity
to patent). Thus, the distance between two firms A and B in year t is:
TECHDIST (A,B) =
√√√√ 25∑
k=1
(pAk − pBk )2
where pAk is the percentage of firm A’s patents in IPC subclass k (IPC 8-digit classification),
respectively B’s patents in class k (pBk ). I survey the 25 largest patent classes for each tire
manufacturer, thus if k is outside these top values then pAk and p
B
k equal zero. Since these
percentages do not sum up to one (e.g. a patent might fall into multiple IPC classes) the
resulting distance measure ranges from 0 (totally similar) to 5 (totally different).
3.4 Controls
Most findings in the literature agree on the significance of firm specifics on alliance formation.
Hence, firm size impacts the degree of technology production and sharing (Bayona et al.,
2001; Veugelers and Cassiman, 2002; Miotti and Sachwald, 2003; Gambardella et al., 2007),
although controlling for its technological endowments may dissipate this effect (Veugelers,
1997). I employ firms’ production capacity as a direct measure of their size in the regressions
(size) and subsequently use also other variables (e.g. number of plants, employees) as proxies
for size, with similar results to the ones reported here. Firm’s age is computed using the
opening year of its first plant. Within our sample the median age is around 50 years,
consistent with a mature industry.
Technological portfolios facilitate the creation and diffusion of new technologies, cross-
fertilization of ideas between alliances partners, and improvements in the absorptive capacity
of firms (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). To quantify firms’ technological capabilities, I use
international patent statistics. Patent stocks for all firms in the industry are computed
using USPTO patent grants (patents) and the perpetual inventory method with an annual
discount rate of 15 percent, common in the contingent literature. Similar results are obtained
using Derwent domestic patent data, which has a global coverage but is less suitable for
international comparisons due to existing differences across national patenting regulations
and fees.
Moreover, the success of such inter-firm partnerships is conditioned by participants’ ca-
pacity to learn and adapt to each other’s way of doing business, while taking advantage
of their counterparts’ abilities. In such situations, prior or existent ties between firms in-
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crease the efficiency of a link through relational routines (Dyer and Singh, 1998) and greater
trust base (Gulati, 1995b), leading to faster technological cross-learning (Kale et al., 2000).
Thus, the existence of formal ties and higher degrees of integration (e.g. majority holdings
or joint-venture projects, as opposed to minority ones) are expected to impact the amount
and quality of technologies exchanged between two firms. These formal ties between firms
are coded using a set of dummies that equal one if one of the firms is a minority holding,
majority holding, or a joint venture13.
3.5 Estimation technique
Considering all possible firm dyads increases significantly the number of observations for our
variable of interest, but introduces an additional problem: since the observed number of 1 s
for PABt is extremely low (only 0.15 percent for exploitation alliances and 0.03 for exploration
ones), running a regular probit or logit estimation will underestimate PABt. To cope with
this, I employ a rare event logit model that generates approximately unbiased and lower-
variance estimates of logit coefficients and their variance-covariance matrix by correcting for
small samples and rare events (King and Zeng, 2001). A technical overview of this estimator
is presented in the Appendix A.114. All estimations report robust standard errors clustered
on dyad.
A second concern regarding the propensity of a dyad to form an alliance refers to the
endogeneity of this decision. Commonly in the literature alliance formation is conceptualized
as a two-stage process (Stuart, 2000): first, firms decide whether they want to partner
up based on their internal characteristics (i.e., technological assets, experience, strategic
intent, competitive pressures, etc.) and second, they seek a suitable alliance partner for
their specific needs. To cope with these endogeneity concerns, I use a two-stage correction
model (Heckman, 1979). In the first stage, using a probit model I estimate the focal firm’s
probability of entering an agreement as a function of its size, age, patent stocks, home market
size and dynamics. The focal firm is defined as the firm in the dyad with the largest number
of patents (if both firms in the dyad have the same number of patents, the focal firm is
arbitrarily considered the first firm of the dyad), and corresponds to the technology provider
is the case of exploitation alliances, respectively firm1 for exploration ones15. The results of
the first stage probit are used to compute an Inverse Mills Ratio which is used to correct
for self-selection in the second stage (rare-event logit) which estimates the probability of two
13The omitted category here is no relationship
14It should be noted that the differences between standard logit and rare-event logit estimates (ran using
the relogit package in Stata) turn out to be negligible in this analysis. The former are available upon request.
15In the first stage the unit of analysis is the (focal) firm
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firms to form an exploitation or an exploration technological alliance 16.
4 Results
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics, while Table 5 presents the matrix of paired corre-
lations for the main variables, all of which are within acceptable limits. The base results
for exploitation alliances are displayed in Table 1 while those for explorative interactions
are presented in Table 2. All estimations use a rare event logit estimator and include het-
eroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors clustered on the dyad.
I start with a basic specification for exploitative alliances (Model 1) that incorporates
only firm controls (size, age, technological capabilities of both provider and recipient, and
existing relationship, if any, between them), two dummies for no availability of sales data, the
Inverse Mills Ratio correction from the Heckman procedure, and a trend variable for captur-
ing existing heterogeneity across time. This will serve throughout the paper as a benchmark
for testing the proposed hypotheses. The results confirm that, on average, bigger and older
firms with technological endowments tend to engage more in alliances as providers of tech-
nology, whereas technology recipients are smaller, less endowed, and much younger. Formal
ties between tire producers increase significantly their chances of exchanging technology and
this effect is amplified by the degree of integration, so that the likelihood of a technology
transfer is higher for a joint venture project than for a majority or a minority holding. Firms
for which no sales data is available (i.e., outside the top 75 largest tire manufacturers world-
wide) are less likely to form an exploitation alliance, either as a provider or as a recipient.
Finally, the Inverse Mills Ratio is significant suggesting that there are indeed selection issue
regarding the choice of forming an alliance.
Models 2 and 3 explore the effects of diversification profile on the propensity to form an
exploitative technological alliance. Corporate diversification of firms has a positive effect for
firms’ engagement in these alliances as technology providers and a negative one as technology
recipients, supporting hypothesis H1a. This suggests that firms who are better diversified
outside the tire domain, are more likely to set-up technological alliances for exploitation
(Model 2). In contrast, the effects of technological diversification appear not to be related
to alliance decisions (Model 3). This suggests that the degree of technological diversifica-
tion is not indicative of firms’ decision to enter exploitation alliances, neither as providers
nor as recipients of technologies. In terms of dyadic properties, the analysis suggests that
product similarity (as measured by the Jaccard index) is a strong predictor of exploitative
technological partnerships (Model 4) confirming hypothesis H2a. Likewise, technological
16In the second stage the unit of analysis is the dyad (pair of firms)
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Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
only controls H1a H2a H3a all
Controls
Log size provider 6.475*** 6.143*** 6.524*** 6.340*** 6.209*** 5.965*** 5.674***
[0.831] [0.834] [0.836] [0.865] [0.871] [0.877] [0.868]
Log size recipient -0.208** -0.210** -0.206** -0.249** -0.205** -0.251** -0.256**
[0.096] [0.095] [0.096] [0.104] [0.096] [0.108] [0.105]
Age provider 0.447*** 0.427*** 0.449*** 0.433*** 0.430*** 0.406*** 0.390***
[0.059] [0.059] [0.059] [0.061] [0.062] [0.062] [0.061]
Age recipient -0.009+ -0.008 -0.009+ -0.011+ -0.011** -0.013** -0.012**
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Log patents provider 22.814*** 21.651*** 22.937*** 22.115*** 21.920*** 20.789*** 19.752***
[3.027] [3.027] [3.035] [3.117] [3.211] [3.197] [3.147]
Log patents recipient -0.156 -0.101 -0.201 -0.108 -0.149 -0.105 -0.106
[0.145] [0.148] [0.161] [0.147] [0.149] [0.156] [0.181]
Time trend 0.075+ 0.088** 0.076** 0.090** 0.080** 0.081+ 0.117**
[0.038] [0.043] [0.038] [0.040] [0.040] [0.044] [0.049]
Minority holding 3.966*** 4.243*** 3.974*** 3.872*** 3.969*** 3.815*** 4.075***
[0.428] [0.477] [0.427] [0.433] [0.447] [0.432] [0.487]
Majority holding 5.584*** 5.522*** 5.750*** 5.468*** 6.008*** 5.807*** 6.030***
[0.865] [0.747] [0.935] [0.732] [0.933] [0.780] [0.782]
Joint-venture 5.776*** 5.851*** 5.795*** 5.956*** 5.848*** 5.951*** 6.059***
[0.668] [0.690] [0.679] [0.659] [0.683] [0.643] [0.650]
No data provider -0.947*** -0.916*** -0.972*** -0.993*** -95.382*** -90.687*** -1.032***
[0.204] [0.213] [0.204] [0.196] [13.550] [13.505] [0.207]
No data recipient -0.934*** -0.701*** -0.932*** -0.894*** -0.962*** -1.017*** -0.645**
[0.254] [0.261] [0.255] [0.257] [0.201] [0.194] [0.308]
IMR -99.234*** -94.346*** -99.808*** -96.378*** -93.322*** -91.253*** -86.376***
[12.783] [12.790] [12.826] [13.172] [13.256] [13.256] [13.299]
Firm-level variables
Corporate diversif provider 0.014** 0.023***
[0.006] [0.006]
Corporate diversif recipient -0.015** -0.013+
[0.007] [0.008]
Tech diversif provider 0.004 0.000
[0.006] [0.006]
Tech diversif recipient 0.018 0.026
[0.030] [0.029]
Dyadic-level variables
Product similarity 1.792*** 2.066***
[0.474] [0.494]
Tech distance 0.155** 0.125** 0.153**
[0.069] [0.054] [0.066]
Tech distance2 -0.300
[0.210]
N 426,922 426,922 426,922 426,914 356,802 356,802 356,802
Mean VIF 3.49 3.18 3.24 3.33 3.44 5.06 2.38
Table 1: Firm and dyadic determinants of exploitative technological alliances. Rare-event
logistic regression
Notes: The dependent variable equals 1 for exploitative technological alliances, and 0 otherwise; all models include a constant,
not reported due to space constraints; the ”no data” dummies to control for missing sales data for providers and recipients;
†, ** and *** indicate variables that are significant at the 10%, 5% and respectively 1%; Robust standard errors clustered on
dyad in parentheses; Mean VIF (Variance inflated factor) computed across all dependent variables)
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distance between firms in terms of patent portfolios appears to stimulate exploitative in-
teractions between firms (Model 5). When testing for non-linear effects the coefficient of
these squared variable is negative but not statistically significant (Model 6), indicating that
both product similarity and technological distance between two firms relate positively and
linearly to the formation of exploitation alliances. Finally, all variables are incorporated in
the full model (Model 7). Despite minor collinearity issues, the results are fairly robust:
bigger, more experienced and diversified firms have a higher propensity to provide technology
while younger, smaller and less diversified ones usually receive it. Market diversification is
indicative of firm’s role in exploitative interactions (i.e., provider or recipient). Similarity in
terms of production is a strong driver of these agreements while technological similarity or
diversity is not necessary for these interactions. The computed variance inflation factors for
all models and variables are most times within the appropriate range. The only exception is
when the squared terms of technological distance is included (VIF=8.56). Thus, dropping
this squared term in our final full model improves dramatically the overall the standard
errors of our estimates, resulting in an acceptable VIF value of 2.38.
Models 8 through 14 (Table 2) perform similar estimations in the case of exploration
alliances that occur only in 0.04 percent of possible dyads in the dataset. The firm-level
controls imply that in such partnerships both firms are rather large, young and with sig-
nificant technological capabilities (i.e., large patent stocks). The results of Models 9 and
10 strongly support the second part of my first hypothesis (H1b), suggesting that both
corporate and technological diversity of prospective partners have positive effects on their
propensity to engage in exploration via a technological alliance. Regarding the impact of
dyadic characteristics, the results provide partial support for my hypotheses. Thus, product
similarity between firms is positively associated with formation of exploration technologi-
cal alliances (Model 11), while greater differences in terms of technological endowments of
firms has a negative effect (Model 12). However, despite some evidence (Model 13), due
to multicollinearity issues it is impossible to provide a strong support for non-linear effects.
Despite centering these terms the VIF values remain high (4.45), although below critical
threshold of 10 discussed in the literature. As a result of these statistical issues in estimating
the joint impact of all these variables (VIF 9.32), in Model 14 I exclude this quadratic
term.
4.1 Robustness checks
To further validate these findings, I perform additional checks that target several key as-
pects. Specifically, I include country fixed-effects (to address the unobserved effects of cross-
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Variables Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14
only controls H1b H2b H3b all
Controls
Log size firm1 7.031*** 7.099*** 7.408*** 7.055*** 6.749*** 6.855*** 6.195***
[0.825] [0.797] [0.895] [0.805] [0.823] [0.836] [0.841]
Log size firm2 -0.198** -0.166+ -0.169+ -0.155+ -0.156+ -0.153+ -0.190+
[0.098] [0.091] [0.095] [0.092] [0.091] [0.091] [0.100]
Age firm1 -0.486*** -0.495*** -0.514*** -0.492*** -0.471*** -0.479*** -0.433***
[0.058] [0.057] [0.063] [0.057] [0.059] [0.060] [0.060]
Age firm2 -0.012** -0.011** -0.012** -0.012** -0.013** -0.013** -0.016***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006]
Log patents firm1 24.700*** 25.151*** 26.081*** 24.989*** 23.932*** 24.348*** 21.798***
[2.999] [2.923] [3.235] [2.947] [3.048] [3.101] [3.075]
Log patents firm2 0.191** 0.152+ 0.140+ 0.029 0.150+ 0.158+ 0.069
[0.091] [0.086] [0.083] [0.098] [0.086] [0.087] [0.098]
Time trend 0.093** 0.080** 0.084** 0.081** 0.065+ 0.079** 0.123***
[0.037] [0.036] [0.035] [0.036] [0.038] [0.037] [0.044]
Minority holding 3.832*** 3.912*** 3.822*** 3.924*** 3.827*** 3.860*** 3.929***
[0.413] [0.414] [0.405] [0.417] [0.424] [0.434] [0.428]
Majority holding 5.580*** 5.525*** 5.563*** 5.677*** 5.779*** 5.790*** 6.122***
[0.544] [0.532] [0.529] [0.540] [0.635] [0.642] [0.639]
Joint-venture 5.929*** 5.758*** 5.707*** 5.724*** 5.712*** 5.778*** 6.009***
[0.622] [0.631] [0.578] [0.618] [0.620] [0.641] [0.598]
No data firm1 -0.892*** -0.868*** -0.863*** -0.870*** -0.883*** -0.871*** -0.859***
[0.195] [0.198] [0.194] [0.202] [0.196] [0.196] [0.212]
No data firm2 -0.913*** -0.955*** -0.911*** -0.906*** -0.937*** -0.911*** -0.755***
[0.245] [0.242] [0.243] [0.245] [0.248] [0.254] [0.250]
IMR -107.403*** -109.203*** -113.052*** -108.502*** -103.963*** -105.735*** -95.056***
[12.653] [12.324] [13.627] [12.431] [12.846] [13.068] [12.982]
Firm-level variables
Corporate diversif firm1 0.016*** 0.024***
[0.006] [0.006]
Corporate diversif firm2 0.036*** 0.033***
[0.007] [0.010]
Tech diversif firm1 0.018*** 0.016***
[0.005] [0.006]
Tech diversif firm2 0.027*** 0.032***
[0.009] [0.009]
Dyadic-level variables
Product similarity 1.659*** 2.045***
[0.450] [0.478]
Tech distance -0.160** -0.175 -0.151**
[0.066] [0.198] [0.064]
Tech distance2 0.092+
[0.051]
N 427,032 427,032 427,032 356,899 356,899 356,899
Mean VIF 3.19 3.25 3.33 3.45 5.07 2.78
Table 2: Firm and dyadic determinants of explorative technological alliances. Rare event
logistic regression
Notes: The dependent variable equals 1 for explorative technological alliances, and 0 otherwise; all models include a constant,
not reported due to space constraints; the ”no data” dummies to control for missing sales data for providers and recipients;
†, ** and *** indicate variables that are significant at the 10%, 5% and respectively 1%; Robust standard errors clustered on
dyad in parentheses; Mean VIF (Variance inflated factor) computed across all dependent variables)
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country heterogeneity), run the analysis in various sub-samples of the dataset (e.g., exclude
sequentially the biggest firms in the industry), use a more conservative measure of alliance
formation (i.e., ”new” alliances, defined as longstanding technological agreements between
partners that have not been engaged in the past), and employ other estimation methods and
control variables. These robustness checks are carried out for both exploitative and explo-
rative alliances, and overall, their results support my previous conjectures. These results are
not reported here due to space constraints, but are available upon request.
The inclusion of country fixed-effects wipes out the impact of firm size and weakens the
significance of the recipients corporate diversification, while gradual exclusion of the big tire
producers (top 3, and then top 5) indicates that within such sub-samples both providers and
recipients are less technological diversified. The analysis of different samples (before and af-
ter 1992, as the median year in my dataset) reveals that smaller firms and minority holdings
were more inclined to share technologies between 1986 and 1991 than the following period.
Moreover, employing a more conservative measure for alliance formation by analyzing only
”new” agreements (defined as technology exchanges between two firms that have not inter-
acted in the past in our sample) draws similar conclusions to the main analyses. Finally,
while my measure of corporate diversification (percent of sales from non-tire products) is
drawing closely to a measure of unrelated diversification, I have also employed a different
measure (i.e., the number of tire types produced) as a proxy for related diversification, which
is positive but not statistically significant in most of the estimations. This suggests that only
firms with superior capabilities that allows them to successfully diversify in unrelated areas
are able to form technological alliances for both exploitation and exploration.
Furthermore, I check the results against other estimation methods (i.e., multinomial logit,
which allows three choices for each dyad, i.e., 1-exploitation alliance; 2-exploration alliance
and 3- no alliance, under the assumption that these are independent, which is confirmed by
the data), data samples (using a smaller sample that contains all the 1 s and a random draw
of 5 percent of zero observations to minimize the possible bias arising from the large number
of zeros) and control variables 17. All these results are in line with my main findings.
Finally, I check for potential interdependencies in formation of exploration and exploita-
tion alliances using a bivariate probit. This estimator determines jointly parameter estimates
for exploitation and exploration alliances allowing contemporaneous correlation between the
error terms of these two equations. The estimated coefficients are in line with those of the
relogit estimations, reinforcing my previous conjectures. Moreover, the rho parameter of the
17I test several alternative measures for firm size (log number of plants and log number of workers),
technological similarity (tech common) using a dummy variable if the firm employs radial tire technology,
cross-ply or both; technological diversity using tech breadth as the number of IPC-8 classes in which a firm
patents).
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model suggests indeed that the choice for these two types of alliance choices are not strongly
correlated (Chi-square=0.412, p=0.516), supporting my initial choice to run separate regres-
sions for each outcome.
5 Discussion and conclusions
There is a growing consensus among scholars that in order to remain competitive, firms must
balance exploration and exploitation across different markets and technologies (March, 1991).
In the past, most firms have focused on the internal dimension of technology exploration and
exploitation preferring to undertake R&D and utilize its results in-house (Chesbrough, 2007).
However, with increasing global competition and technological change, firms opt more and
more for alliances as a mean to optimize their exploration-exploitation opportunities (Lavie
and Rosenkopf, 2006).
This study argues that diversification profile of a firm affects its possibilities and choices
for technological alliances. In doing so, it proposes several contributions to the extant liter-
ature. First, it links theoretically firms’ diversification strategies with their alliance choices.
Specifically, it looks at two main measures of diversification, namely corporate and technolog-
ical, which give a broad picture of firms’ strategies across industries and technologies. Firms
can be extremely successful in one of these dimensions or a combination of them, which re-
sults in different needs and strategies for forming alliances. Second, following previous work
in this area, this study combines both firm-level and dyadic-level explanations to address the
important heterogeneity behind the drivers of alliance formation (Wang and Zajac, 2007).
Third, different from most previous studies on alliance formation, which focus solely on one
dyadic characteristic, this paper distinguishes between product and technological similarities
between prospective partners and their implication for exploitation and exploration. Finally,
this study is set in the context of a mature and low-tech industry (tires) that usually gets
bypassed by the alliance and innovation literature. While the aggregate R&D intensity of
the industry justifies its ”medium low-tech” label, technology has always played a significant
role in the tire domain and it is actively pursued by the industry’s leaders, which makes it
a prime background for testing these effects.
My results emphasize different effects of the hypothesized variables on the propensity to
engage in alliances based on the type of technological exchanges observed. I find that corpo-
rate diversifiers (across industries) tend to engage more in technological alliances either as
partners (exploration) or as providers (exploitation). This finding is in line with both Teece’s
(2007) dynamic capability theory and the diversification strategy literature (Granstrand,
2000), suggesting that through corporate diversification firms acquire new knowledge re-
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garding potential avenues to capitalize on existing technological assets. Moreover, the recent
surge in inter-firm agreements worldwide suggests that such advantages in terms of exploita-
tion of technological capabilities have become increasingly important in today’s competitive
and global environment of firms (Makino and Delios, 1996). Furthermore, the support for
the role of technological diversification on exploration alliances is strong and robust, support-
ing prior conjectures in the literature (Giuri et al, 2004; Gambardella et al., 2007). Thus,
exploration in technological alliances relies heavily on partners with large and diversified
portfolios as it increases the avenues for learning and collaboration.
Besides these firm characteristics that affect their propensity to form technological col-
laborations, dyadic characteristics also motivate alliance partnering decisions (Wang and
Zajac, 2007). Product similarity is consistently associated with higher probability of set-
ting up both exploitation and exploration alliances. Moreover, this relationship is linear,
implying that firms seek partners from similar product areas in both scenarios. Similarly,
the results show a strong positive relationship between technological distance and involve-
ment in exploitative alliances, suggesting that partners need to be complementary in this
respect (Rothaermel and Boeker, 2007). Oppositely, large technological distances discourage
exploration alliances, as both partners require a certain level of overlap to start a mutually
convenient collaboration (Sampson, 2007; Yang et al., 2010). The econometric results pro-
vide insufficient support for the hypothesized non-linear effect of technological distance on
alliance formation. Partly, this is the result of the multicollinearity problem, which prevents
an efficient estimation of the coefficient of the squared term of this dyadic measure.
Overall, these findings point out towards a more general trend of complementarity (in
terms of partner size, age, knowledge, production base and diversification levels) in exploita-
tion alliances. The only exception, and a robust one, is given by the strong positive impact
of product similarity of two firms on their propensity to engage in exploitative agreements.
Moreover, these results are consistent with the application of ”exploration-exploitation”
paradigm to alliance formation (Lavie and Roesenkopf, 2006). Organizational inertia, either
as market position or technological commitments, results in strong preferences for incumbents
towards exploitation of existing assets (Rothaermel, 2001). Oppositely, partner similarity
along all dimensions (age, size, technological portfolio, production portfolio, diversification
strategies), except technological assets, is a strong driver of exploration alliances that involve
bilateral technology exchanges and mutual learning (Sampson, 2007). Given the significant
dispersion in terms of innovation and R&D efforts between large and small firms in the in-
dustry (Bayona et al., 2001), seeking strong technological performance is not surprising18.
18The rate of innovation in large tire producers exceeds that of small-firms by more than 8, or about 8
innovations per thousand of employees (Acs and Audretsch, 1987)
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Firms that engage partners in R&D activities will pursue knowledge sharing and develop-
ment of new technologies and products (Rothaermel, 2001), while those who seek to exploit
their technological assets will opt for more hierarchical agreements with unidirectional flows
of technologies to their partners in exchange for access to production facilities, marketing or
supply agreements, and other non-technological benefits (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004).
In terms of managerial implications, the results suggest that the organization of tech-
nology exploration and exploitation via technological alliances presents both opportunities
and additional challenges. Well-diversified firms across different markets are able to harness
new knowledge, which in turn increases their appeal and opportunities for more alliances.
Likewise, diverse technological portfolios present also greater opportunities for exploration
and trigger subsequently superior economic performance (Sampson, 2007). Therefore, firms
should invest more in achieving greater diversification across markets and technologies, as
these actions will subsequently present firms with more external opportunities for exploration
and exploitation. Moreover, the characteristics of prospective partners are indicative of the
type of alliance preferred. Dyadic similarities in terms of products and technologies provide
the necessary absorptive capability and channels for communication of technological content,
and thus favoring exploitative interactions. In turn, firms seeking to learn and develop new
technologies via exploration alliances should focus on partners with similar products but
very different technological portfolios from their own.
The present study has, of course, several shortcomings that may serve as premises for
subsequent work in this area. First, despite its global reach and longitudinal dimension,
this analysis is constrained to a single industry which is characterized by a lower number
of technological actors, as compared to a younger, more tech-intensive industry (e.g., semi-
conductors) that is populated by many atomistic, R&D intensive firms. Inherently, this
affects the richness and structure of alliance data, so that it is likely to have more explo-
ration in high-tech industries than otherwise. Second, this work focuses exclusively on the
within-industry dimension of technological alliances, dictated by the link between our diver-
sification measures, which are all relative to the tire industry. Future extensions of this work
could adopt different measures of diversification (e.g., international) and also examine the
intra-industry alliances of tire producers to shed light on the links between vertical integra-
tion strategies and firm diversification profiles. Such additions may provide a complete and
perhaps different picture of alliance activities for tire producers, as they vary or balance their
exploration-exploitation strategies across contingent industries and countries. Finally, the
issues pertaining to data availability and accuracy are important, especially in the case of
firms from developing nations in the 1980s. These problems were addressed where possible
through backward revisions of data as new and more reliable statistics were published in the
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reference industrial journals19.
In conclusion, this study provides some interesting insights on the interplay between
firm diversification and alliance formation in the context of a mature, low-tech sector. Fur-
ther inquiries are needed to gain better understanding of the motivation and outcomes of
such inter-firm connections, and how they possibly differ from the ”mainstream” conclusions
based on high-tech industries. Such extensions could include comparative studies on other
low or medium-tech industries, careful documentation of the alliance terms, and a complete
tracks of cooperative relations between partners. Some of these mature industries still ex-
hibit a high technological turnover among the leading companies, but most importantly,
compose the backbone of all economies in the world. Thus, understanding the motivation
and benefits of such interactions may yield important policy lessons for both developed and
developing nations in which mature industries are still responsible for a large share of GDP
and employment.
19For example many Chinese firms are not reported in the 1980s and early 1990s, although they show up
in later statistics with plants dating back to the 1970s
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A Appendix. Additional tables and figures
A.1 The rare-event logit estimator
For a binary outcome variable Yi (i=1,...,n) denoting yt = 1 (occurence) or yt = 0 (non-
occurence) let x0 be a 1 x k vector of chosen values of the explanatory variables. The
method of computing the probability of occurence is a function of the maximum likelihood
estimate (βˆ):
Pr(Y0 = 1/ βˆ = pi0 = 1/(1 + e
−x0βˆ)
where βˆ is obtained using the common log-likelihood estimator lnL(β|Y ) = −∑ ln(1 +
e(1−2Yi)xiβ))
In finite sample of rare events data, the computation of these probabilities is affected by
two distinct problems (King and Zeng, 2001). First,
ˆ
β is a biased estimate of β and this bias
can be computed using this formula:
b(βˆ) = (X ′WX)−1X ′Wξ
where X = [x1, x2, ..., xT ] is a vector of exogenous explanatory variables, W is the diagonal
matrix constructed from piT (1−piT )wT , ξ = 0.5tr(Q)[(1+w1)piT−w1], tr is the trace operator
and wT equals w1 = ε(yT )/y¯ for cases, and wT equals w0 = (1− ε(yt))/(1− y¯ for non-cases.
Applying this correction reduces also the variance for the bias corrected estimator so that
β˜ = βˆ − b(βˆ).
Second, when probabilities are estimated from β˜, the changes in this parameter do not
affect pif symmetrically and therefore do not cancel out. Hence, the probability calculation
can be corrected for this issue by considering the distribution of fβ˜ of β˜ which can be
approximated by
Pr(Yf = 1|xf ) ≈ pif + Cf
Cf = (0.5− pif )pif (1− pif )x0ν(β˜)x′0
where x0 are the exogenous values for some arbitrarily chosen comparison group and ν() is
the covariance matrix (King and Zheng, 2001).
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Year Countries Firms Plants Avg. Plants per Firm Tech agreem Patent percent
1985 77 208 368 1.77 75 9.14
1986 77 216 383 1.77 82 9.80
1987 77 218 391 1.79 96 9.13
1988 79 233 401 1.72 101 10.36
1989 80 235 410 1.74 104 9.01
1990 77 238 412 1.73 115 8.81
1991 83 261 417 1.60 122 8.30
1992 84 266 424 1.59 138 8.17
1993 82 288 426 1.48 132 7.19
1994 84 306 449 1.47 144 7.07
1995 84 306 452 1.48 143 6.73
1996 81 310 467 1.51 130 5.96
Table 3: Global tire industry and active technological alliances (1985–1996)
Notes: Tech agreem refers to the total number of active technological alliances in a certain year; Patent percent refers to the
percentage of firms of the total having patents as of that year
Variable Description Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Exploit alliance dummy for exploitation technological alliance 764,540 1.00 0.05 0.00 1.00
Explore alliance dummy for exploration technological alliance 762,676 0.00 0.02 0.00 1.00
Log size log production capacity (tonnes/year) 673,929 9.63 1.49 4.40 17.55
Age firm age (years) 714,749 50.94 22.75 10.00 145.00
Log patent stock log USPTO patent stock 762,676 0.22 0.88 0.00 6.00
Minority holding dummy for minority holdings 560,097 0.00 0.02 0.00 1.00
Majority holding dummy for majority holdings 560,097 0.00 0.02 0.00 1.00
Joint-venture dummy for joint ventures 560,097 0.00 0.02 0.00 1.00
Corporate diversif percentage of sales from non-tire products 762,676 25.90 13.80 0.00 99.00
Tech diversif inverse Herfindhal top 25 IPC-8 patent classes 764,540 1.67 4.71 1.00 76.92
Product similarity Jaccard index of tire types produced 760,988 0.37 0.29 0.00 1.00
Tech distance Euclidian distance top 25 IPC-8 patent classes 764,480 0.09 0.25 0.00 2.70
Table 4: Descriptive statistics
Notes: Product similarity and Tech distance are dyadic constructs using values for both firms in a dyad, while the rest of the
variables refer to all the firms in the dataset; given that I consider all possible pairs of firms they are virtually symmetric for
providers/recipient or firm 1/firm 2 listed in a dyad)
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Technology agreements Technology agreements
Country Providers Recipients Country Providers Recipients
Angola - 2 Netherlands 2 2
Argentina - 1 New Zeeland - 1
Australia - 3 Nigeria - 2
Austria - 2 Norway - 1
Canada 2 0 Pakistan - 4
Chile - 2 Peru - 3
China - 32 Philippines - 6
Colombia - 3 Poland - 4
Costa Rica - 2 Portugal 2 4
Czech Republic 2 1 Russia - 4
Czechoslovakia 2 8 Slovak Republic - 2
Ecuador - 1 Slovenia 1 2
Egypt - 3 South Africa 12 7
Ethiopia - 1 Sri Lanka - 4
Finland - 1 Sweden 2 4
France 20 5 Taiwan - 9
Germany 32 13 Tanzania - 1
Ghana - 2 Thailand - 7
Hungary - 4 Trinidad and Tobago - 1
India - 22 Tunisia - 1
Indonesia - 12 Turkey - 8
Iran - 4 USSR - 1
Iraq - 1 United Kingdom 35 5
Italy 26 1 United States 91 24
Ivory Coast - 1 Uruguay - 3
Japan 60 10 Venezuela - 1
Kenya - 3 West Germany 3 5
Korea, Republic 5 6 Yugoslavia 2 7
Malaysia 3 18 Zaire - 1
Mexico - 10 Zambia - 2
Morocco - 2 Zimbabwe - 2
Mozambique - 2
Table 6: Tire producers involved in technological alliances worldwide (1985-1996)
Note: These figures include inflows and outflows of technology from a country, which occur via new (exploitation and exploration)
alliances between two firms that have not been engaged previously in any collaborations. Thus, renewals or extensions of
existing alliances are counted only once in this table; ”Providers” counts the number of firms involved in exploitation alliances
as providers of technological content, while ”Recipients” refers to firms that receive technology in exploitative alliances, or share
it with their partners in explorative ones
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Year Type of agreement Participants Coding Additional Information Source
1990 Minority cross-ownership Continental AG of Germany
and Toyo Tire and Rubber
of Japan
EXP Continental acquired a 30% stake in Ryoto, a sub-
sidiary of Toyo Tire and Rubber. In return, Toyo
agreed to take minority holdings in two plants
owned by Continental’s subsidiaries. The compa-
nies hope to share production capacity thus en-
large their markets.
SDC Platinum, Ac-
cesed May 2010
1993 JV establishment Continental AG of Ger-
many, its subsidiary Gen-
eral Tire (USA) and Grupo
Carso SAB de CV (Mexico)
EXP Grupo Carso and General Tire each contributed
two plants to the new company, in which Grupo
Carso was to hold a majority controlling interest.
The venture wants to be the largest Mexican tire
manufacturer and service network.
SDC Platinum, Ac-
cesed May 2010
1994 Strategic alliance Grupe Michelin of France
and Continental AG of Ger-
many
EXP The name of the 50-50% JV is Michelin-
Continential Projects and it aims to produce tires
in Europe and enforce the competitiveness of the
two, which will continue to remain competitors.
The venture is expected to save each of them
around $57 million US.
SDC Platinum, Ac-
cesed May 2010
1995 Collaborative agreement Cooper Tire & Rubber of
USA and the ContiTech
Group of Germany
EXR For technical assistance, licensing agreements, and
design plus development cooperation; it covers
projects in areas such as automotive vibration con-
trol, hose products and weather sealing.
Rubber World, Apr
1995, Vol. 212, Issue
1, p14.
1998 Supply agreement Goodyear (USA) and Sum-
itomo (Japan)
EXP Products covered in this agreement: replacement
tires
Freedonia Group
(1998)
1999 Strategic alliance Pirelli SpA of Italy and
Cooper Tire & Rubber Co.
of USA
EXP Cooper will handle sales and distribution of Pirelli
tires in North America, where Cooper is better
positioned, while Pirelli will handle Cooper’s sale
in South America, where it has a strong presence.
Cooper will also send personel to Pirelli’s Hanford,
CA, tire plant, to help straighten out its failing op-
eration. Also technological exchanges are involved.
Rubber & Plastics
News; Apr. 2002, Vol.
31 Issue 19, p8.
2000 Collaborative agreement Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co. of USA and Group
Michelin SA of France
EXR This agreement aims at setting an industry stan-
dard and broadening the appeal and availability
for run-flat tires; it consists of jointly operated
R&D operations based in the Netherlands and
license each other’s respective run-flat technolo-
gies.Goodyear has developed run-flat technology
that mounts on a conventional rim, while Michelin
has an integrated wheel-and-tire system.
Wall Street Journal.
(Eastern edition).
New York, N.Y.: Jun
23, 2000. pg. 1.
2002 Outsourcing Continetal AG of Germany
and Metro Tyres Ltd. Of
India
EXP Continental will outsource many of its motorcycle
and scooter tires to Metro Tyres’ dedicated new
plant in Ludhiana, India. Also, the partners have
signed long-term agreements covering both off-take
production and technological support (US $10m).
Rubber & Plastics
News, November 4,
2002
2002 JV establishement Yokohama Rubber (50%) of
Japan and Continental AG
(50%) of Germany
EXP To promote Continental tires to Japanese and Ko-
rean automakers. They also signed a contract for
exchanging tire technology. (US$ 100m)
Rubber World,
Mar2002, Vol. 225
Issue 6, p12.
2003 Strategic alliance Michelin Group of France
and Hankook Tire Co. Ltd
of South Korea
EXP Michelin will purchase a 10% stake in the company,
which controls 46% of the Korean tire market. In
addition, from 2004 the two companies will join to
manufacture Michelin tires in Hankook’s existing
facilities. In a separate deal, Michelin has agreed
to provide its Run-flat technology to Hankook.
China & North East
Asia Monitor, Aug.
2003, Vol. 10 Issue 8,
p7.
2004 Licesing agreement Groupe Michelin of France
and Toyo Tire & Rubber
Co. Ltd of Japan
EXP The agreements provides Toyo with the most ad-
vanced runflat technology (PAX) despite having
developed its own runflat tire in the past.Toyo
becomes the fourth PAX licensee after Pirelli,
Goodyear and Sumitomo Rubber.
European Rubber
Journal, Jun 2004,
Vol. 186, Issue 6, p8.
2006 Licesing agreement Qingdao Qizhou Rubber
Co. Ltd of China and
Amerityre Corp. of USA
EXP Qingdao Qizhou has signed a license agreement
with Amerityre Corp. to make polyurethane elas-
tomer retreads for three large-size OTR mining
tyres. (US$ 0.4m)
Urethanes Technol-
ogy; Oct/Nov2006,
Vol. 23, Issue 5, p19.
2008 JV establishement Pirelli SpA of Italy and the
Russian Technologies State
Corporation
EXP The agreement includes construction of a new in-
dustrial complex for production of car and truck
tyres by 2010 in the Russian region of Samara with
governmental support (US$ 300m).
European Rubber
Journal, Nov/Dec
2008, Vol. 190, Issue
6, p10.
Table 7: Examples of alliances between firms in the tire industry
Note: These agreements were collected from various sources listed in the last column and may, or may not, involve technology
exchanges. Only those that incorporate technology exchanges and have been signed between 1985 and 1996 are the object of
this study; Coding EXP is form exploitation alliances, while EXR is for exploration alliances.
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